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ABSTRACT
In recent years, currency swaps are drawing much interest from
international bankers and corporate treasurers. The art of currency
swaps has been quite well-developed in the United States and European
Capital Markets. However, not many swap transactions have been arranged
in the Asia Pacific region.
Opportunities exist for international banks in Hong Kong to act as
intermediaries between the counter-parties of a currency swap. In many
cases, the intermediary bank has to offer long-date forward contracts to
the parties. The bank then takes up the foreign exchange exposure. The
pricing of the forward contract is therefore a very important feature of
currency swaps. In addition, pricing also involves the bank's charges
for hedging fee, front-end fee and commission.
In the Asia Pacific region, it is expected that the potential for
doing currency swaps lies in US dollar/yen swaps. The liberalization
of the Japanese financial system and the attitude of the Ministry of
Finance towards swaps are the critical factors for the potential to
realise.
Analysis of the commercial needs for currency swaps should be done
along industry lines. Two analysis are performed in this report:
China's offshore oil ventures and the shipping industry. Great





1.1 Purpose of the Project 1
1.2 Research Objectives 2
1.3 Scope of the Research 3
1.4 Methodology 4
1.4.1 Literature Review 4
1.4.2 Interviews 4
1.4.3 Discussions 4
II. CURRENT DEVELOPMENT OF SWAP FINANCING
2.1 Origin 6
2.2 Emergence of Swaps 6
2.3 Transaction Volumes 7
2.4 The Major Players 8
2.5 The Future 9
III. OPERATION AND BENEFITS OF A CURRENCY SWAP
3.1 Basic Ideas 10
3.2 Variations of Currency Swap 10
3.3 The Mechanism of Typical Currency Swaps 11
3.3.1 Cross Currency Floating to Fixed Debt Swap 11
3.3.2 Cross Currency Fixed to Fixed Debt Swap 14
3.3.3 The Cocktail Swap 16
3.4 The Philanthropic Nature 18
IV. PRICING OF CURRENCY SWAPS
4.1 Pricing of the Long-date Forward Contracts 20
4.1.1 The Role of the Long--date Forward Contracts in Li
Currency Swaps 20
4.1.2 Exposure in the Long-date Forward Contracts 28
4.1.3 Approaches for Pricing of the Long-date Forward
Contracts 31
4.1.4 Summary of the Section 54
4.2 The Fees Charged by an Intermediating Bank 55
4.3 Chapter Summary 58
V. OPPORTUNITIES TO ENTER THE DOLLAR/YEN MARKET
5.1 Structural Changes in the Japanese Financial System 60
5.2 The Internationalization of the Yen 62
5.3 The Liberalization of Bonds 64
5.4 The Swap Regulator 69
VI. EXPLORATORY STUDY ON THE C01,111ERCIAL NEEDS FOR CURRENCY SWAP GPs
IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION
6.1 Opportunities in China's Offshore Oil Ventures 72
6.2 Opportunities in the Shipping Industry 80
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 89
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
3.1 Cross Currency Floating to Fixed Debt Swap......................12
3.2 Cross Currency Fixed to Fixed Debt Swap.........................15
3.3 The Cocktail Swap...............................................17
4.1 Currency Swap which Does Not Need a Long-date Forward
Contract............................................................21
4.2 Currency, Swap in which Long-date Forward Contracts are
Needed for Making up the Subsidy....................................23
4.3 Currency Swap in which Long-date Forward Contracts are
Needed for Interest Payments and Principal Repayments...............25
4. 4 The First Fully-hedged Dual-currency Swap......................27
6.1 Basic Framework of the Shikumisen 'LI:echanism..................84
6.2 Currency Swap Utilizing the Shikumisen Mechanism................87




4.1 Parity Forward Rate for Short-term
Forward Contract................. 34
4.2 Parity Forward Rate Method for
Single-payment, Mutli-period Forward Contract 35
4.3 Average-rate Method for Multi-
payment, Multi-period Forward Contract 38
4. 4 Current-yield Curve Method for i Multi--
payment, Multi-period Forward Contract... 39
4.5 Exchange of Borrowings Method for Multi-
payment, Multi-period Forward Contract 41
4.6 Investment Side of the Fully Arbitrage
Cash-flow-based Method 43
4.7 The Distribution of the Investment Proportion
in Table 4.6 45
4.8 Liabilities Side of the Fully Arbitrag
Cash-flow-based Method............. 46
4.9 Yen Liabilities Expressed in Terms of the
Bank's Annual US Dollar Payment (X)...... 47
4.10 Interest Payments Expressed in Terms of the
Bank's Annual US Dollar Payment (X)...... 48
4.11 Total Annual Yen Pays enLs Expressed in Term
of Bank's Annual US Dollar Payments (X)... 49
4.12 Forward Rates For the Contract.,. 49
13 Cleint's Specification on Proportion of
Yen Payments........................... 50
4.14 Yen Liabilities Expressed in Terms of the Annual
US Dollar Payment (X)....................... 51
4.15 Yen Interest Payments Expressed in Terms of
, . . , , , . . . .the Annual Dollar Payment (X)
.52
4.16 Total Annual Yen Payments Expressed in Terms
of the Annual US Dollar Payments (X)
.53
4.I7 Forward Rates for the Contract
.53
4.18 Comparison of Forward Rates Generated From




Swaps have altered the financial map.
No treasurer, or country for that matter
can afford to sit back and wait.
(Andrew Large, SBCI1)
Swaps are the greatest challenge yet
to the agile banking mind, and like the
study of the universe itself, there is
no horizon.
(Euromoney, November 1983, p.60)
In the financial world, the word swap is used to describe a
number of financial techniques in foreign exchange, long-term financing,
exposure management, and asset management in banking. In this research,
the kind of swap studied is a long-term financing technique offered to
treasurers and ministers of finance. Citibank can act as the inter-
mediary for two or more counter parties, or, it can be one of the
parties in a swap transaction.
As a long-term financing technique, swap can be categorized as
interest rate swap and currency swap. Currency swap involves exchange
of corporate debts, which are denominated in different currencies,
between (among) the parties, while interest rate swap involves exchanges
denominated only one currency.
Today, the major motive for currency swap is the arbitrage between
capital markets. In this fashion, the first major publicized currency
swap was arranged by Salomon Brothers for the World Bank and IBM in
August 1981. Therefore, it is a fairly new concept in exploiting
capital market inefficiency.
1Mr. Andrew Large is the Chief Executive and Deputy Chairman of Swiss
Bank Corporation International Limited (SBCI).
1. 1 Purposes of the Project
This research is intended to explore the intermediary role of
Citibank Hong Kong in arranging currency swaps for corporations in Hong
Kong and the Asia Pacific region. As a lending centre, Hong Kong has
been the locale for most of the long-term financing projects in the
region. Moreover, Hong Kong is a major foreign exchange market.
Therefore, Citibank, as an active player in the global swaps market and
foreign exchange market, has much opportunity to arrange currency swaps
for corporations in the Asia Pacific region.
Besides, emphasis has been paid on the pricing of the long-date
forward contracts in the currency swaps, since it is the current concern
of Citibank' s Treasury.
Since the currency swap is quite unheard of in Hong Kong, this
research may also act as a pioneer study to stimulate further research
on this powerful financing technique. Finally, this research also
offers a chance for the authors to work on a practical issue and,
through their effort, to benefit a real organization.
1. 2 Research Objectives
Besides describing the swaps market and operation of currency
swaps, this research contains four other ma-in chapters. The first three
cover the pricing, environmental factors, and commercial demand of
currency swaps in the region. The last one contains recommendations and
a conclusion.
iLong-date forward contracts refer to forward exchange contracts
which maturity is over one year.
3Under Pricing of Currency Swaps (Chapter IV), a framework for
pricing the long-date forward contract in currency swaps is analysed.
In addition, the fees charged by an intermediating bank are also
explored.
Under Opportunities to Enter the Dollar/Yen Market (Chapter V),
the potential of the Dollar/Yen market is assessed. The characteristics
of the Dollar and Yen capital markets are also analysed with reference
to potential currency swaps.
Under Exploratory Study on the Commercial Need for Currency Swaps
in the Asia Pacific region (Chapter VI), general market conditions for
currency swaps in the region are discussed. Then, two industries with
high potential use of currency swaps are investigated. They are the
offshore oil ventures in China and the shipping industry in the region.
Their need for this financing technique is explored.
Finally, under Recommendations and Conclusions (Chapter VII), the
roles of Citibank's Treasury in the pricing of the long-date forward
contract and currency swaps are discussed. Moreover, suggestions are
made for Ci tibank's marketing strategy in the oil and shipping
industries.
1.3 Scope of the Research
In Chapter IV, the pricing section focuses on analysing the
conceptual framework for pricing and hedging the long-date forward
contract. Considerations in the determination of swap fees will also be
.discussed. But, the exact determination of the fees is not included in
this study.
In Chapter V, the analysis of environmental factors is a
descriptive account of the Dollar and Yen capital markets. However, the
technical operations in these two markets are left to Citibank's
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practitioners to develop.
In Chapter VI, the market survey is an exploratory assessment of
the market potential of the offshore oil ventures in China and the
shipping industry in the region. Individual companies' potential is not
analysed in this research.
Finally, in Chapter VII, discussion of the roles of Citibank's
Treasury in long-term forward contracts and currency swaps is also only
exploratory. Citibank's practitioners have the background and expertise
to make a detailed and comprehensive investigation of this issue. In
addition, the suggestions on marketing strategy are industry-oriented
and are not narrowed down to individual companies.
1.4 Methodology
1.4.1 Literature Review
A literature review is chosen as the major basis for this research.
Since currency swaps are sophisticated financial techniques, a
literature review gives the foundation for analysing its opertations and
the mechanism in pricing the long-date forward contract. As an
exploratory study, literature review is also the best method to
integrate analytical frameworks on currency swaps. Moreover, a
comprehensive description of the characteristics of the Dollar and Yen
capital markets is best obtained from library literature. Finally, a
literature review is also an efficient tool for studying the industries'
market potential.
1.4.2 Interviews
Comments and opinions from the staff of Citibank's Treasury and the
lecturers of the Chinese University of Hong Kong were obtained through
interviews. These interviews led to the construction of the objectives
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and scope of this research. Moreover, they acted as guidance for
keeping theroiect practical and useful
1.4.3. Discussions
Since currency swaps are fairly new in Hong Kong, few people know
about them. Informal discussions with professionals in the field were
carried out to further explain the market to the authors. Moreover, the
sophisticated mechanisms of currency swaps were also discussed and
explored under various informal circumstances. However, the people
involved in these discussions did not disclose their companies' roles in
and plans for arranging currency swaps in the region.
6HPATER II
CURRENT DEVELOPMENT OF SWAP FINANCING
2.1 Origin
The basic concept of swap can be traced back to parallel loans in
the 1960's. Parallel loans are paired loan agreements whereby one
party, with excess liquidity in a particular currency, makes these
funds available to a second party. In exchange, the second party
makes an equivalent amount of a second currency in which it has excess
liquidity available to the first party. An implicit forward contract
exists because the principal will be repaid at an exchange rate fixed
at the time the deal is made. In those days the primary role of
paralled loans was to bypass the UK exchange controls by matching loans
between UK and US parent companies and their local subsidiaries.
2.2 Emergence of Swap s
A swap shares many of the same purposes and characteristics of
a parallel loan. However, in.a straight currency swap, companies do
not lend currencies but sell them to each other and, at the same time,
enter into a commitment to buy back the same amounts at a fixed
rate in the future.
When it was recognised that a swap was a simpler device,
swaps began to replace parallel loans and emerge as an efficient
fund-raising technique. The initial documentation of a currency swap
is simpler because it involves only one agreement, not two loan
agreements. Furthermore, security problems associated with the right
of offset on one party's default can be circumvented.
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But currency swaps are not used primarily to bypass exchange
controls. Today, the major motive is to arbitrage between world
capital markets in an era of floating exchange rates, which has existed
since the abolition of the Bret ton Woods Agreement.
In the late 197O's, Citibank entered the currency swap business.
However, it was the World Bank, IBM and Salomon Brothers in August
1981 who did the first major publicized swap. That transaction brought
swaps into the open and has been the main impetus behind the market's
rapid growth..
Added to the power of currency swaps was the innovation of a
related financing technique, the interest rate swap. With an interest:
rate swap, the nature of interest payments of a debt can be changed.
The typical case is for two counter-parties to swap interest payments
from fixed to floating and vice versa. This provides further
flexibility for the operation of cross currency swaps.
2. 3 TransacLion Volumes
Because of the secrecy of swap transactions (in many deals)
secrecy is a contractual requirement), it is very difficult to
estimate accurately the size of the market or the volume of transactions
conducted by a particular bank. Even when a deal is made public, the
counter-party usually remains unidentified,
Euromoney estimated that the 1982 volume of currency swap was
between US$5 and USS7 billion. This was probably double the 1981
Simon Tait, It Takes Two to Tango, Euromoney, February, 1983, p.75.
volume. The estimated volume of interest rete swaps for the same
1
period was USS15 billion
2.4 The Major Players
According to a spokesman of S. G. Warburg, "There are only five or
six major players, another half dozen who've done sevral transactions.
2and there are 30 to 50 other banks trying to do one deal."
Citibank is a marker leader in both interest rate and currency
swaps. Being the biggest bank in the world.Citibank has a large
lient bass for watching swap deal among its own custoners. Besides
Citibank, other big US commercial banks with well-developed investment
bamking arms have dominated the swap business. The leaders will
continue as leaders because swap expertise can be built only over a











Advertising Supplement, Euromoney, January,1983.
P.61.
2
"Tje Way into Any Market," Cover Story in Zuromoney, November,1983,
92.5 The Future
When bankers and financial journalists review the past two years,
no report will be complete if swaps are omitted. It is not that they
have dominated the international capital markets. Rather it is their
potential that is considered to be important. The development of
swap financing is still in its infancy. However, as bond markets
shorten in maturity and foreign exchange markets lengthen, the




J.A.M. Price, J. Keller and M. Neilson, The Delicate Art of Swaps,
Eurorioney, April, 1983, p.118.
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CHAPTER III
OPERATION AND BENEFITS OF A CURRENCY SWAP
3.1 Basic Ideas
A currency swap involves the exchange of debt into another
currency until maturity. Basically, the two counter-parties exercise
a spot currency transaction for the exchange of borrowings. At the
same time, there is an agreement to reverse the currency transaction
when repayment is made, of ten at a pre-agreed exchange rate.
Additionally, each counter-party pays interest on the other's loan as
if it were the borrower. Usually, a formula is worked out to take
account of the interest rate differential and exchange rate differential
over the term of the swap. Based on the forward rates generated,
notional annual or semi-annual interest payments are netted out between
the two parties, usually with the intermediation of a bank.
Compared with an interest rate swap, a currency swap is more
complicated. The currency swap involves both interest rate and exchange
rate differentials. The interest rate swap concerns interest payment in
the same currency.
3. 2 Variations of Currency Swap
A Currency swap is not a standardized product. There are always
new possibilities to be considered. The swap engineer must constantly
search for new combinations of markets. Each transaction has its
peculiarities. Any swap package is a product of a different mi'x of
markets, currencies, payment intervals, maturity, yield curves and
risks. A change in regulations in a capital market or a corporation's
tax considerations may trigger a new approach to the currency swap.
It is an art that awaits fresh breakthroughs and innovations.
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3.3 The Mechanism of Typical Currency Swaps
While there are tremendous variations, the basic swap mechanism
can be understood. by the discussion of three typical categories.
3.3.1 Cross Currency Floating to Fixed Debt Swap
This is similar to an interest rate swap in that one party converts
a floating-rate liability into a fixed-rate liability. The main reason
for this is the presence of credit anomaly. Banks and some large
corporations are usually strong borrowers in that they can obtain
fixed-rate funds by a public bond issue. But banks usually lend money
out on a floating-rate basis. As a result, the less creditworthy
borrowers are unable to fund themselves on a fixed-rate basis. With
floating to fixed debt swap the less creditworthy borrower can borrow
bank funds on a floating-rate basis and swap this funding into a
fixed-rate basis by entering into a swap with the fixed-rate issuer.
The cross currency floating to fixed debt swap also involves
interest payments and principal repayments in two different currencies
because the floating-rate finance is in one currency and the fixed-rate
finance in another. Differing perceptions of who is a good risk in the
world's various capital markets is the key.
Figure 3.1 describes the typical situation. Company A, a Japanese
corporation, may borrow Y10,000 million from the Japanese capital
market for five years at 6% payable annually. Company B may borrow
the US dollar equivalent of Y10,000 million, say, US$40 million from
the Eurodollar market, for five years at Libor plus a margin (say 0.5%)
payable annually. Under a swap agreement, there is an exchange of
currencies on day one. Moreover, Company A would agree to pay to
Company B dollars equal to the interest payments and principal- repayment
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Figure 3.1 Cross Currency Floaating to Fixed Debt swap
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payment rates. In return Company B would pay to Company A yen equal
to the interest payments and principal repayment due under Company A's
fixed-rate yen loan. Under this arrangement, Company A acts as a
surrogate borrower of fixed-rate yen for Company B, and Company B as a
surrogate .borrower of floating-rate dollars for Company A.
The issue of creditworthiness previously mentioned may be relevant
for a variety of reasons. For example, debt ratios employed by
Japanese firms, although acceptable for the highest credit standing in
Japan, are typically much higher than what would be considered sound
by U.S. lenders. Hence a Japanese multinational seeking dollar funds to
finance its U.S. subsidiaries is faced with high risk premium in its
borrowing costs. With a currency swap, it can borrow yen at preferred
rates in Japan, transform the liability into US dollars to finance its
U.S. operations, and obtain the forward cover necessary to service its
yen debt. The requsite swap contract would provide for the delivery of
forward U.S. dollars (which come from the U.S. operations) against
yen. Such a contract would give the highly levered Japanese firm a
fully hedged financing cost considerably below that which is available
directly in US dollars.
A further illustration of the benefits of variations on this
type of arrangement is provided by the transaction between a French car
company, Renault, and a Japanese security house, Yamaichi. The swap was
arranged by Bankers Trust Company, which also acted as intermediating
principal to the counter-parties, in July 1981. Yamaichi was
acting as principal for a number of Japanese institutional investors.
At that time, Renault was unable (for regulatory reasons) to borrow
fixed-rate yen finance. So Renault raised floating-rate US dollar
debt and Yamaichi purchased dollar-denominated floating-rate notes with
identical rate-setting dates for Japanese investors. As a result,
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Renault was able to simulate a fixed-rate yen borrowing. Japanese
investors were able to include foreign assets (dollar Floating Rate
Notes) in their portfolios and, at the same time, hedge their dollar
investment back into yen. The yield received was higher than that
available on other ve n fixed-rate investments.
3.3.2 Cross Currency Fixed to Fixed Debt Swap
This is very similar to the cross currency floating to fixed debt
swap. The main difference is that all interest payments are fixed-rate.
This type of swap was given much publicity by the transaction between
IBM and the World Bank. Complete particulars of this transaction are
not available. The basic elements are depicted in Figure 3.2.
Some years ago IBM needed to raise substantial funds. The amount
required was too large for the U.S. capital market alone. So IBM
raised large amounts in the Deutschemark and Swiss franc capital
markets. These loans were converted into dollars and remitted back to
the head office.
Some time later, the World Bank tried to raise funds in currencies
with low interest rates, such as the Swiss franc, Deutschemark and yen.
The amounts required were then too large for these markets to support.
The difficulty was resolved by two World Bank issues of dollar
fixed-rate Eurobonds with maturities exactly matching IBM's existing
Swiss franc and Deutschemark debt. Under a currency swap agreement,
IBM would pay all the future interest and principal payments on the
World Bank's dollar Eurobonds. In return the World Banff. would pay all
the future interest and principal payments on IBM's Swiss and
Deutschemark debt.
The transaction was made possible because the dollar appreciated
substantially against the Swiss franc and Deutschemark from the time IBM
15
US$ fixed rate (P+i)
IBM World Bank
DM/Swfr fixed rate (P+i)
DM/Swf r US$ fixed
fixed rate rate (P+i)
(P+i)
P= principal repayment
IBM Swfr i= interest payments USS
bond holders Eurobond
holders
Figure 3.2 Cross Currency Fixed to Fixed Debt Swap
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borrowed these currencies to the time it entered into the swap
transaction with the World Bank. IBM was then able to lock in a foreign
exchange profit by converting the foreign liabilities into simulated
dollar liabilities. For the holders of the Deutschemarks, the cost of
financing was reduced from 10% to 8.15%, when the rate on U. S.
government term borrowing was 15%. The World Bank was also able to
convert a dollar 16% fixed-rate liability into a simulated fixed-rate
Deutschemark liability at a cost of approximately 10.13%.
3.3.3 The Cocktail Swap
This category of swaps is discussed to show that there is no
boundary to currency swaps. In essence, it combines the features of
interest rate swap and the two types of cross currency swaps into one
integrated operation. While a bank intermediary is usually necessary
for most swaps, it is almost always a prerequisite for the cocktails.
It is known that some of these transactions have been arranged, but
particulars have not been made public.
The basic ingredients are shown in Figure 3.3. The bank
intermediary's role, as principal, is to write all the swap contracts.
Companies A, B and C may not know one another's identity. As far
as Company A is concerned, it is involved in an interest rate swap.
Typically, it is a less creditworthy borrower. Floating-rate dollars
are borrowed in exchange for a fixed-rate dollar liability.
Company B is a strong borrower in the yen capital market but not
so in the dollar market. Fixed-rate yen are borrowed in exchange for a
floating-rate (below market) dollar liability via a cross currency
fixed to floating debt swap.
Company C is a strong borrower in the dollar capital market but
not so in the yen market. Fixed-rate dollars are borrowed in exchange
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US$ P+i US$ P+i
fixed)(fixed)
Company A Bank Company C(c)(a)
Intermediary
US$ P+i Yen P+i
(floating) (fixed)
US$ P+i Yen P+i(b)
(floating) (fixed)




US$ floating Yen fixed US$ fixed
rate lenders rate lenders rate lenders
(a) interest rate swap
(b) Cross currency fixed to floating debt swap
(c) Cross currency fixed to fixed debt swap
Figure 3.3 The Cocktail Swap
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for a fixed-rate yen liability via a cross currency fixed to fixed
debt swap.
3.4 The Philanthropic Nature
In theory a currency swap transaction will benefit all
participants.
1. The Counter-parties
The greatest incentive for a company to take part in currency swap
is the preference for a particular type of debt. For example, it might
want to get into floating Libor instead of fixed rate yen. Another
major motive is to get out of uncomfortable terms and reap financing
advantages. Opportunities are open to corporate treasurers to:
Arbitrage capital markets to achieve a cheaper all-in cost than
by borrowing the currency directly.
Cover long-term commitments in foreign currencies.
Take advantage of subsidized government financing while
eliminating currency exposure.
Generate foreign assets by buying domestic securities.
Write lease contracts on a hedged basis.
Reap tax advantages.
As a result, many treasurers of big corporations now consider currency
swaps as one of their normal fund-raising options.
2. The Arranger
The Arranger originates the swap, makes proposals to potential
counter-parties, gives advice in negotiations and charges an arrangement
fee for its services. Flat fees of between 1/4 and 1/2% of the amount
raised for each party are common. Investment banks are superior in this
19
aspect because they are more competitive than commercial basks in the
major bond markets.-
3. The Intermediary Bank
Companies seldom swap with one another unless there is a bank in
the middle to take care of the credit risk. The intermediary bank
charges a fee for guaranteeing that one or both sides of the swap
transaction will continue payments until the debts mature. Normal fees
vary between 1/8 and 1/4% a year, depending on the company's credit
s tanding. In addition, there is often a small front-end fee.
Commercial banks can outperform investment banks in this aspect because
of their higher capitalization. In other words, a big commercial bank




PRICING OF CURRENCY SWAPS
In many cases, the intermediary bank has to offer long-date
forward contracts to the parties in a currency swaps. Therefore, it
must price the long-date forward contracts in addition to setting the
front-end fee, hedging fee and commission in the deal. The pricing of
the long-date forward contracts will be analyzed first and then the
determination of the fees will be discussed.
4.1 Pricing of the Long-date Forward Contracts
4.1.1 The Role of the Long-date Forward Contracts in Currency Swaps
Though capital markets arbitrage is the major motive in the
initiation of currency swaps, parties in the deal may also look for
foreign exchange exposure and interest rate exposure coverage. If
a party enters a currency swap solely to seek arbitrage between markets,
it will surely need long-date forward contracts for the interest
payments and principal repayments. If the party also achieves a foreign
exchange exposure coverage in the currency swap, it probably does not
need the intermediating bank's long-date forward contracts. Examples
of the above cases are given below.
1. Currency swaps which do not need long-date forward contracts
If a party covers a foreign exchange exposure in a currency swap,
it will not need forward contracts for future payments since the swap is
.a hedge already. An example is that: a investor wants to invest in
Japan (either in portfolio investment or long-term investment), but it
can only raise US dollar funds. This may be because of the
unavailability of Yen funds under the Japanese government's regulation,
or the Yen funds will be too costly. So, it tries to enter a currency
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swap with a US lessee which locks in a low-cost Yen-denominated lease.
In this deal, the investor obtains low-cost Yen funds and hedges its Yen
revenue. At the same time, the U.S. lessee also obtains a favorable
rate in dollar borrowing, which it cannot get with its own credit
rating, and also eliminates its foreign exchange exposure in Yen
liabilities. Therefore, no forward contract is needed by the parties in
this case. They just have the currencies which they need to pay to one
another. The future payments are illustrated in the following diagram.
Future Interest Payments and Principal Repayments
BForeign Bank U.S. Lessee
Investor Yen a of aYen a
Yen-denominatedin Japan US$ n US$ n
Intermediary
Lease
US$ n Yen a
US Japanese
Lende Lessor
Figure 4.1 Currency Swap which Does Not Need a Long-date Forward
Contract
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2. Currency swaps which need long-date forward contracts
i. One party subsidizes the counter-party's payments
It is common in currency swaps that one party subsidizes the
counter-party's interest payments. The reason behind this is the
creditworthiness of one party is much higher than that of the other.
The motive of the party with higher creditworthiness in entering the
currency swap is, in fact, to get a subsidy for its interest payments.
In this case, the arbitrage between the capital markets is obtained
through the high credit-rating of one party and the subsidy of the
counter-party.
An example is given by extending the example in Figure 4.1. In this
case, the U.S. lessee subsidizes the investor in the Yen interest
payments. Therefore, the investor's cost of funds is lowered and
long-date forward contracts are sold to the lessee by the intermediating
bank. The transactions in the future interest payments and principal
repayments are illustrated in the following diagram.
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*yen a= Yen b+Yen c; and Yen c is the subsidy
Figure 4.2 Currency Swap in Which Long-date Forward Contracts are
Needed for Making up the Subsidy
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In fact, the "Foreign Investor" in Figure 4.2 can be substituted by
a large Japanese corporation which has high credit-rating in the
Euromarket. In this case, the Japanese corporation wants to obtain Yen
at a very low cost by getting the counter-party's subsidy. A
representative example of such a corporation is Japan Air Line (JAL).
Through currency swaps, JAL can borrow Yen funds more cheaply than the
Japanese government.1
However, not all subsidizing parties need long-date forward
contracts in the above manner. If the U.S. lessee is replaced by a
"small Japanese corporation" which needs low cost US follar funds. The
long-date forward contracts are needed by the Japanese corporation for
paying interest and repaying the principal of the dollar liabilities
rather than making up the subsidy. The transactions are illustrated in
the following diagram.




Future Interest Payments and Principal Repayments
Foreign Bank Small
Investor I Yo n }1Yen b
,Japanese





c*Long--date Forward Contracts where
US$ n= Yen x
`Yen a Yen b, the difference is made up by
the Japanese corporation's subsidy.
Figure 4.3 Currency Swap in which Long-date Forward Contracts are
Needed for Interest Payments and Principal Repayments.
26
ii. Pure arbitrage between capital markets
I f a party's motive in entering a currency swap is pure arbitrage
between capital markets, it will need long-date forward contracts for
future interest payments and principal repayments. A representing
example is the dual-currency swap arranged by Morgan Grenfell for
General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC). This dual-currency swap
brought GMAC, a triple-A US corporation, to the Swiss franc public bond
ma rke t. However, all the repayment obligations were swapped into
dollars. In this case, GMAC could pay about one and one quarter percent
below what it had to pay in the US bond market. The full mechanism of
the hedge inside such long-date forward contracts is still not yet known
and it is Morgan Grenfell's secret weapon. Nevertheless, the basic
transactions can be shown in the following diagram.
The Way into Any Market, Euromo ney, November, 1983, P.68.
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repayable in US in
1991 at a rate of
USS 1=Swfr 1.85
**Long-daLe Forward Contracts
*The bonds were issued in October
1983, when the rate was,
US$ I=Swfr 2.1
Figure 4.4 The First Fully-fledged Dual-currency Swaps
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4.1.2. Exposure in the Long-date Forward Contracts
When the intermediating bank sells long-date forward contracts to
its client, it takes up a foreign exchange exposure. Therefore, it must
hedge against this exposure. The approaches to hedge and price the
long-date forward contracts will be discussed in section 4.1.3. In this
section, the exposure in the forward contracts is analyzed first.
1. Foreign exchange exposure in long-date forward contracts
When a bank sells long-date forward contracts to a client, it
promises to deliver a currency to the client in the future in exchange
for another currency at an agreed rate. However, the agreed forward
rate may deviate very much from the spot rate on the future delivery
day. Therefore, this is a foreign exchange exposure which will cause a
foreign exchange gain or loss to the bank. As a result, the bank must
hedge against this expsoure in order to arrive at a justified forward
price (rate) for a long-date forward contracts.
2 The amount of exposure in a long-date forward contract
The amount of foreign exchange exposure in a long-date forward
contract is the amount which is influenced by the fluctuation in
exchange rate. The calculation is illustrated by the following example.
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Example
Bank A sells long-date forward contracts to Company X as follows:
Bank ABank A
Forwardwill receivewill deliver
from Company Xto Company X Rates




4 U. 22 1.00 220
1 _nn0.2 2205
0.2 2 1.00 2206
7n7 0.22 1.00
2.20 10.00 2208
If Bank A determines the forward rates only by fo.rcasting, all
the future payments will be subject to foreign exchange gain on loss due
to the fluctuation of the future spot rates. If no hedging is done, the
exposure in the future years will be the full amount of the Yen










The foreign exchange gain or loss in the future years can be
calculated as follows:
Foreign exchangePercentage
gain or lossExposure X exchange rate
change
1McRae, T.W., and Walker, P.P. Foreign Exchange Management, P.60
Prentice/Hall International, Inc., 1980.
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4.1.3. Approaches for Pricing of the Long-date Forward Contracts
As shown in section 4.1.2., the intermediating bank must hedge
against the forward contracts in order to avoid the foreign exchange
exposure. The forward rates should be determined from the hedge rather
than by forcasting. This determination of forward rates is also called
the pricing of forward contracts. Different approaches for pricing the
contracts will be discussed one by one in the following sections.
In the active short-term forward markets, the forward rates are
determined under the interest rate parity theory. Therefore, before the
pricing methods in long-term forward markets are analysed, the interest
rate parity theory should be discussed first.
I. Interest rate parity theory for short-term forward
This theory states that arbitage between money markets will make
the forward exchange rate stay at interest rate parity, that is, the
interest rate differential is equal to forward rate discount or premium.
Mathematical presentation of the concept is shown as follows:
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Covered arbitrage margin (CAM):
The interest advantage of investment in one currency
over that in another.
CAM
where i x: interest rate on currency x
i y: interest rate on currency y
FR: Forward price (rate) of currency y
in terms of currency x (i.e. currency x/currency y)
R: Spot price (rate) of currency y
in terms of currency x (i.e. currency x/currency y)
is the percentage interest rate differential
(with reference to proceeds from investment
in currency y)
is the percentage forward rate premium or
discount (with reference to spot rate of
currency y)
The interest rate parity theory states that arbitrage will make CAM
equal zero. The forward rate at this point is called "parity forward
rate" (FR*). Putting this into mathematical terms will be:
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. (1)
i. In the short-term markets, the forward rates are, in fact, parity
forward rates determined by equation (1).





One-year forward rate (Yen/US$):
220
ii. The above calculation can also be viewed as the result of hedging
against a one-year forward contract. An example of selling a one-year
US$-Yen forward contract is given to illustrate the hedging mechansim.
To hedge the exposure, an amount of US$ IM is invested in one-year assets
and an equivalent amount of Yen is borrowed for one year. When the
forward contract matures, the bank's dollar assets will generate the
-needed amount (US$ x) for the promised delivery and the client's Yen
payment will be used to pay the Yen liabilities. This hedging rchanism






237.6M 2161. 1MYear 1
(237.6/1.1=216)(1.1M=x)
Table 4.1 Parity Forward Rate for Short-term Forward Contract
2. Parity Forward-rates Method for Single-payment, Multi-period Forward
Contracts
Single-payment, multi-period forward contracts refer to forward
contracts which demand the delivery of a currency in one payment several
years from now.
The most commonly used method for pricing this kind of long-date
forward contract is extended from the interest rate parity theory.
However, its assumptions should be subject to careful analysis.
This pricing method sets the forward rate at interest rate parity
at the maturity date of the forward contract. In another word, the
forward rate will make the return on investments from both currencies
equal one another. However, this method assumes the interest
'differential between the currencies remains the same throughtout the
exposure periods. An example of calculations based on this method is
given below.
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Example: Parity forward rate method
Bank A sells a 7-year forward contract promising
it will exchange US$ x for the client's Yen after
seven years. The common pricing method assumes
the hedge of this forward contract as follows:
Yen Exchange rateUS Dollar
borrowinginvestment (Yen/US$)








Table 4.2 Parity Forward Rate Method for Single-payment, Multi-
period Forward Contract
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If the above forward rate is calculated by extending equation (1),
the calculation is as follows:
220FR*
220
The above calculation basically assumes that the interest gained
from the dollar investment can be reinvested at 10% and the interest
paid for the Yen borrowing can be rolled over at 8%. Obviously, this
assumption is not very realistic as interest rates fluctuate very much.
Therefore, this method is, in fact, not very suitable for pricing
long-date Eo rward contracts.
3. Average Forward-rate Method for Pricing Multi-payment, Multi-
period Forward Contracts
This is a commonly used pricing method. However, it also tries to
set the forward rates at interest rate parity by assuming that the
interest rate remains unchanged over the exposure periods.
Besides, this method assumes the bank will hedge the forward
contract with an average interest rate differential. This average
interest rate differential is the differential for the longest period of
the contract. Obviously, the interest rate differential for the periods
in between can deviate from this average-rate considerably. However,
when this method is used in pure mathematical calculation, this
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erroneous assumption cannot be easily seen. An example of this method
is given below.
Example: Average forward-rate method
Bank A sells a 7-year forward contract promising it will deliver
US$ X annually over the coming seven years in exchange for the client's






at year n, the forward rate FRn is calcualted by the equation:
r
FRn= 220
Therefore, the forward rate in the coming years are:
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Year Yen PremiumForward rates










Table 4.3 Average-rate Method for Multi-payment, Multi-period Fon%Tard
Contract
Since this method also assumes that the interest rate differential
will remain unchanged, the forward rate at the seventh year (193.48) is
the same as that in Table 4.2.
4. Current-yield Curve Method for Pricing Multi-payment, Multi-period
Forward Contracts
The current-yield curve method takes a m re accurate view than the
average-rate method in section 3. This method takes into account of the
current-yield curve of the entire exposure period. In another word, the
current-yield (interest rates) for different periods in the future are
considered. However, the name current-yield curve inn plies that only
the yield curve for the present moment is considered. This means that
the interest of the investments and liabilities is assumed to be
reinvested and rolled over at the cur rent-yield curve. Therefore, this
pricing method still carries the weak assumption which exists in the
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methods described in section 2 and 3. Nevertheless, these methods are
still adopted by many people in the market. An example of this pricing
method is given below.
Example: Current yield-curve method
Bank. A sells a 7-year forward contract promising it will deliver
US$ X annually over the coming seven years in exchange for the client's
Yen. By extending equation (1) and substituting the interest rates with
the current-yield, the forward rates are found as follows:
Maturity Year Forward Rate*Current-yield(%)
US$ Ye n(n) (Yen/US$)
0 Spot rates= 220.00
1 10.0 FR1= 216.008.0
2 10.5 8. 1 F R2= 210.55
3 11.0 FR 3= 204.908.4
4 10.6 FR4= 201.528.2
10.1 8.0 FR.= 199.805
7.96 9.8 FR 6= 198.12
7 10.0 8.0 FR7= 193.48
220
where i.: current-yield of Yen of maturity year n.
i$ : current-yield of US dollar of maturity
year n.







As indicated by the formula for calculating the forward rates, this
pricing mehtod assumes that the interest differential for each maturity
year between the two currencies will remain unchanged over time. In
fact, this assumption is also the basic weakness of the above method.
5. Exchange of Borrowings Method for Pricing Multi-payment, Multi-
period Forward Contracts
This method is a fully hedged method for pricing forward contracts.
However, this method can be used only when there is an agreement to
exchange the interest payments and principal repayments of borrowing in
two different currencies.
If two parties in a currency swap agree to exchange their
borrowings without one party subsidizing the other (Figure 4.1), this
method can be used to price the forward contracts between the two
parties. In this case, the intermediating bank only acts as the
guarantee for the parties' execution of the contracts. An example of
this pricing method is given below.
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Example: Exchange of borrowings method
Two parties enter a currency swap. They exchange their US dollar
and Yen 7-year borrowings. The cash inflow (outflow) of the borrowings
is shown as follows:
Yen Exchange rateUS dollar
(at 8%)(at 10%)Year (Yen/US$)
9 9nxx 220 (spot rate)0
176(o. IX)1 (17.6X)
1762 (17.6X)o.1X
17_X 176Co. I x)3




Table 4.5 Exchange of Borrowings Method for Multi-payment, Multi-
period Forward Contract
Unless one of the parties defaults, there is no foreign exchange
exposure for the bank in guaranteeing the forward contracts. Therefore,
the default risk rather than foreign exchange risk is the concern in
this kind of forward contract. In fact, the default loss is the foreign
exchange loss, if there is any.
6. Fully Arbitraged Cash-flow-based Method for Pricing Mutli-payment,
Multi-period Forward Contracts
This method provides an access to price forward contracts on a
fully hedged basis. The exposure is fully hedged by exact matching of
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the cash inflow and outflow of the forward contracts. The matching
includes both of the' amount of cash flow and the maturity days of the
hedge. Therefore, all the foreign exchange exposure and interest rate
exposure are covered. That means, all uncertainty is eliminated.
Though mismatch in maturity days may exist in the practical world,
this section will discuss the matching of cash flow. Handling of
mismatch in maturity days will be discussed in the summary of this
chapter. An example of this pricing method is given below.
Example: Fully arbitraged cash-flow-based method
Bank A sells a 7 -year forward contract promising it will deliver
US$ X annually over the coming seven years in exchange for the client's
Yen. The forward contract is priced by the hedge as follows:
i. The US$ X payments for the coming seven years will be generated by
the following investment in US dollars:
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Table 4.6 Investment Side of the Fully Arbitrage Cash-flow-based Method
U.S. dollar Investment (Years of maturity)
Total
US$ Cash 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year
Year flow at10.0% atl O.5% at11.0% atlO.6% at10.0%
0 (A* ) (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6) (A7)
1 X A2* C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7
2 X A3* C3 C4 C5 C6 C7
3 X A4* C4 C5 C6 C7
4 X A5* C5 C6 C7
5 X A6* C6 C7
6 X A7* C7
7 X X*
Where As are amounts of US$ assets and Cs are amounts of coupon
(interest) payments.
Year 7 X A7 + C7 x = A7 + 0.10x A7 =X/1.10
(asset value plus coupon)
Year 6 A7
A6 + C6 A7 = A6 + 0.098A A6 = A7/1.098
(asset value plus coupon)
and A7 + C7 = X(total cash generated)
Year 5 A6 A5+C5 A6 = A5 + 0.101A5 A5=A6/1.101
(asset value plusn coupon,
and A6 + C6 + C7 = A7 = C7 x(total cash generated)
Year 4 A5 A4 + C4 A5 = A4+0.106A4 A4 = A5/1.106
and A5 + C5 + C6 + C7 A6 + C6 + C7 X(total cast
generated)
Year 3 A4 A3 + C3 A4 = A3 + 0.11A3 A3 = A4/1.11
and A4 + A4 + C5 + C6 + C7 A5 + C5 + C6 + C7 = x
(total cash generated)
Year 2 A3 A2 + C2 A2 = A2 + 0.105A2 A2 = A3/1.105
and A3 + C3 + C4 + C5 + C6 + C7
A4 + C4 + C5 + C6
+ C7 = X(total cash generated)
Year 1 Az =1.10A1 A1 = A2/1.10
and A2 = C2 + C3 + C4 + C5 + C6 + C7 = A3 + C3 + C4
+ C5 + C6 + C7(otal cash generated)
Year 0 A A1 + A2 + A3 + A4 +A 5 + A6 + A7
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The total investment (total assets) A is
i i. The liabilities side of the hedge is shown as follows:
The first variable to be maintained by the bank is the proportion
of the liabilites distributed over the seven year period. Besides
providing a complete hedge of the exposure, this pricing method also
allows the bank to manipulate the forward rates by varying the
proportion of liabilities. The mechanism of manipulating the forward
rates is shown in the two examples which follow:
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Case 1 The distribution of debt proportion is the same as the
distribution of investment proportion.


















Table 4, 7 Distribution of the Investment Proportion in Table 4.6
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Table 4.8 Liabilities Side of the Fully Arbitrage Cash-flow-based
Method





Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year
at at at at at at at
8.0% 8.1% 8.4% 8.2% 8.0% 7.9% 8.0%
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7





















Ds are debts,"i"sare interest payents and Ps are total payments
of the years.
Therefore;
P1 = D1 + i1 + i2 + i3 + i4 + i5 + i6 + i7
P2 = D2 + i2 + i3 + i4 + i5 + i6 + i7
P3 = D3 + i3 + i4 + i5 + i6 + i7
P4 = D4 + i4 + i5 + i6 + i7
P5 = D5 + i5 + i6 + i7
P6 = D6 + i6 + i7
P7 = D7 + i7
The total amount of Yen debt, D,is:
D = D1 + D2 + D3 + D4 +Di5 + D6 + D7
and D = 220A, where US$ 1 =Yen 220 is the spot rate;


















In. this case, the debt proportion in. Table 4.8 equals the
investment proportion in Table 4.6. If the liabilities are expressed in
terms of the Bank's annual U.S. dollar payment, they are:
Exposured inMaturity Yen Expressed in terms o[-
terms of Xtotal debt DYear Liabilites
2 2 0 A0.188D7 D7
(220)(0.909)1:= 200X
0. 171DD66 20A= (22-0) (0.828),N
18 2x
220A= (220) (00 752)X0. 155DD)55
= 165X




_ I 14THD22 220A= (220)(00554)x
= 122X
220A= (220) (Om 504)}Oo 104D1 DL
= iii x
From Tabie 4.7
From Table 4.7 or P.4br
- - Spot exchange rate is US $1= `men 220
Table 4.9 Yen Liabilities Expressed in Terms of the Bank's Annual US
Dollar Payment (X)
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If the interest payments are expressed in terms of X, they will be as
follows:
Maturity Interest Interest payments expressed
Year payments in terms of X
7 i 7 0.08*D 7**= 0.08) (200X)= 6X
6 i 6 0.79D 6= 0.079) (182X)= 4.4X
5 i 5 0.08D 5= (0.08) (165X)= 3.2X
4 i 4 0.082D 4= (0.082) (150X)= 12.3X
3 i 3 0.84D 3= (0.084) (135X)= 11.3X
2 i 2 0.081D 2= (0.081) (122X)= 9.9X
1 i 1 0.08D 1= (0.08) (111X)= 8.9X
*Interest rate of the maturity year, from Table 4.8
**From Table 4.9
Table 4.10 Interest Payments Expressed in Terms of the Bank's Annual
Us Dollar Payment(X)
The total payments for the years are:
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Maturity Total Total payments expressed
in terms of X**year payments*
7 P7 200X+ 16X= 216X
6 P, 182X+ 14.4X+ 16X= 212.4Xb
5 P5 165X+ 13.2X+ 14.4X+ 16X= 208.6X
4 P4 150X+ 12.3X+ 13.2X+ 14.4X+ 16X= 205.9X
3 P3 135X+ 11.3X+ 12.3X= 13.2X+ 14.4X+ 16X
=202.2X
2 P2 122X+ 9.9X+ 11.3X+ 12.3X+ 13.2X+ 14.4X
+ 16X= 199.1X
1 P1 111X+ 8.9X+ 9.9X+ 11.3X +12.3X+ 13.2X+
14.4X+ 16X= 19 7X
* From Table 4.8
** From Table 4.9 and Table 4.10
Table 4.11 Total Annual Yen Payments Expressed in Terms of the
Bank's Annual US Dollar Payments (X)
Therefore, the forward rates are:
Year Forward rates (Yen/US$)
1 P1/ X 19 7X/ X 197.0
2 P2/ X 199.1X/x 199.1
3 P3/ X 202.2X/ X 202.2
4 P4./ X 205. 9X/ X 205.9
P5/ X5 208.6X/ X 208.6
P6/ X6 212.4X/ X 212.4
7 P7/ X 216X/ X 216.0
















Case 2: The distribution of debt proportion is different from the
distribution of investment proportion.
The fully arbitraged cash-flow-based pricing method also allows the
Bank to receive the Yen in specific proportion demanded by the client.
Suppose the client wishes to pay its Yen in the following proportions:
Maturity Proportion of the Expressed in terms
Year Total Yen liabilities of total Yen debt, D
1 1% 0.01D
2 5% 0.0 5D
3 9% 0.09D




Table 4.13 Client's Specification on Proportion of Yen Payments
The Bank can easily adapt to the client's demand by imposing the
above proportions on the Yen borrowing in the hedge. Then the Yen
liabilities, which mature in the coming years, will be exactly covered
by the client's payments. If the Yen principal and interest payments
are expressed in terms of the Bank's annual US dollar payment (X), they
will be as follows:
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Maturity Yen
Year debt Yen debt expressed in terms of X










Table 4.14 Yen Liabilities Expressed In Terms the Ammual US Dollar
Payments(X)
If the interest payments are also expressed in terms of X,they will be
as follows:
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Matur i ty Yen Interest Interest payments expressed








* Yield of the maturity year, from Table 4.8
** From Table 4.14
Table 4.15 Yen Interest Payments Expressed in Terms of the Annual
US Dollar Payments (X)
The total payments for the years are:
Maturity Total Total payments expressed










k From Table 4.8
From Table 4.14 and Table 4.15
Table 4.16 Total Annual Yen Payments Expressed in Terms of the
Annual US Dollar Payments {X)
Therefore, the forward rates are:







* From Table 4.16




















When Table 4.17 is compared with Table 4.12, great difference can
be recognised between the two sets of forward rates. They are shown as
fnllow:
Forward rates fromForward rates from








Table 4.18 Comparison of Forward Rates Generated From Two Different
Hedges of a 7-year Forward Contract
As shown in the above title, the fully arbitraged cash-flow--based
pricing method allows the intermediating bank to manipulate the prices
of long-date forward contracts in meeting the clients' demand. Added to
its fully hedged cash flow, this method offers the best and the most
flexible approach to the Bank in pricing long-date forward contracts.
4.1.4 Summary of the Section
Section 4.1 begins with role of the long-date forward contracts in
currency swaps" (4.1-1). Then, exposure in the long-date forward
contracts "and "approaches for pricing of the long-date forward
contracts" (4.1.3.) are discussed.
Section 4.1.1 explains why long-date forward contracts are needed




how foreign exchange exposure arises in the long-date forward contracts.
Section 4.1.3 analyzes five methods for pricing long-date forward
contracts.
Section 4.1.3 begins with a discussion on the interest rate
parity theory, since this theory is the basis for pricing forward
contracts in the short-term markets. Then three commonly used methods
for pricing long-date forward contracts are discussed. These methods
try to extend the interest rate parity theory to the long-term forward
markets. However, all of these methods make a weak assumption that the
reinvestment rate in the future will be the same as the current rate.
That is, they assume that the interest rate differential between two
currencies will remain unchanged over time.
After discussing these three methods, the exchange of borrowings
method and the fully arbitraged cash-flow-based method are
introduced. Under these two methods, the exposure in the long-date
forward contracts is fully hedged. However, the latter has a much
broader application than the former in pricing forward contracts.
Besides, the latter one also allows the bank to manipulate the forward
rates to meet the client's demand. The core of the hedge in the fully
arbitraged method is presented in Table 4.6 and Table 4.8. In
addition, based on Table 4.7 and Table 4.14, two different sets of
forward rates are generated by this pricing method and they are
presented in Table 4.12 and Table 4.17.
4.2 The Fees Charged by an Intermediating Bank
Basically, there are three kinds of fees charged by an intermed-
iating bank. They are the hedging fee, the front-end fee and the
commission. These will be discussed in the following section.
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4.2.1 Different Kinds of Fees
First, the hedging fee is to pay for the bank's work on hedging the
forward contract for the parties of the currency swaps. Turning to the
front-end fee, it is the amount which the bank needs to start
structuring the currency swaps. Finally, the commission is charged when
major transactions in the currency swaps are completed by the
intermediating banks. Usually, these transactions are the annual
interest payments and principal repayments of the currency swaps.
4.2.2 Determination of the Amount Charged
I
The intermediating bank usually charges 1/4 to 1/2% in fees. In
addition, the currency swaps must save around 1/4 to 1/2% of the funding
costs of the participants. Therefore, to realize a currency swap, there
must be at least 3/4 to 1% of arbitrage between the capital markets.
Besides, negotiation is also an important factor in determining the
amount of fees charged. There are a number of elements which affect the
ngrtiP_-, 1 nPcntiatino,-- trencrh_ ThPV ar Ii ct-PA ac 11nr.T
1. Perceived need for the currency swap
If a party perceives that it urgently needs the currency swap, its
negotiating strength usually decreases. This case usually occurs when
the party uses the currency swap for foreign exposure coverage.
1




2. Amount of cost saved
When the currency swap offers a very attractive cost saving, the
party's negotiating strength may decrease. This is because the
opportunity can be taken up by other parties. Moreover, such an
opportunity may never come up again.
3. Availability and need for the currencies
When a party is badly in need of a currency which it cannot obtain
easily by some reason, its negotiating strength in the currency swap
will decrease. Government regulation can be a reason for such
unavailability. The Japanese government's control of the money supply is
a good example for this. Usually, such unavailability affects quite a
number of corporations. In this case, the currency becomes a relatively
scarce resource wanted by many people. Therefore, the party's
negotiating strength decreases.
4. Synchronization of cash flow
If the cash inflow and outflow in a currency swap is highly
synchronized, the party's negotiating strength will decrease.
Synchronization is measured in terms of timing and amount. Synchroni-
zation of cash flow brings the least amount of irregularity to the
parity. The parity's negotiating strength decrease because it can save
funding costs or cover exposure without increasing management's work
load.
The synchronization can be the result of similar terms in interest
payments and principal repayments. However, this can also be the result
of the intermediating bank's active effort in manipulating the hedge.
The result of such manipulation is fully illustrated in the fully
arbitraged cash-flow-based pricing method. With this method, the bank
can deliver an equal amount of US dollars annually for seven years,
while it receives 60% of the client's total Yen payment in the last two
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years.
5. Experience in international financial management
When a party is more experienced in international financial
management, its negotiating strength increases. This is because it has
connection with more financial institutions and is able to get a better
bargaining price. Besides, it can evaluate more accurately the
attractiveness of the currency swap opportunity. Finally, it usually
has access to more capital markets than less experienced parties.
4.3- Chapter Summary
In this chapter, section 4.1 focuses on the pricing of long-date
forward contracts and section 4.2 focuses on the fees charged by the
intermediating bank. These two areas are the core considerations of the
pricing of currency swaps. However, the discussion is still an
exploratory one. When the analytical frameworks are put into practice,
a number of technical issues will arise for the practitioners to solve.
One major technical problem is the mismatch of maturity days in the
hedge of the fully arbitraged cash-flow-based method in the pricing of
a long-date forward contract. Though it is the best alternative among
the pricing methods, mismatch of maturity days in the hedge of ten
occurs. Buying an odd-day short-term forward contract or foreign.
exchange futures can partly solve this problem. In addition, interest
rate futures can be bought or sold for complete closing of the mismatch
gap.
However, the calculation of the forward rates will be affected by
this complication since extra cost is involved in these actions. A
detailed analysis of such calculations is beyond the scope of this
research. Nevertheless, this research can be used by the Treasury of
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Citibank (long Kong as a start for analysing the pricing of long-date
forward contracts and for identifying opportunities for arranging
currency swaps in the Asia Pacific region.
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CHAPTER V
OPPORTUNITIES TO ENTER THE DOLLAR/YEN MARKET
The most public manifestation of swaps has been the flood of
Eurobond and Swiss bond issues launched to provide the fixed-rate side
of the swap. Many corporations borrow low-cost Swiss francs to swap
into US dollars. But there is very little potential for a bank in Hong
Kong to act as an intermediary or as a counter-party for these swaps.
The opportunity for doing currency swaps in the Asia Pacific
region should lie in the US dollar and Yen capital markets. The Asian
capital markets are embodied around Singapore, Hong Kong and Tokyo.
Singapore has become the centre for Asian dollar deposits. Tokyo
controls the Yen market. Hong Kong with its more laissez-faire
approach attracts many financial intermediaries to use various currency
resources to engage in capital market activity.
The development of dollar/yen swaps relates closely to the Japanese
financial system. Japanese banks are emerging as major international
lenders Tokyo is evolving into a major international capital market
interest rate movements will be deregulated. These rapid changes have
created extensive potential for swap engineers. In particular, the
internationalization of the Yen and the liberalization of long-term Yen
bonds are critical. These structural changes have gathered pace
during the last few years.
5.1 Structural Changes in the Japanese Financial System
Control over financial transactions took shape rapidly when Japan
began to reconstruct its economy immediately after the War. The
authorities enforced tight control over the activities of private
financial institutions. A regulated low interest-rate policy was
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adopted to stimulate economic growth. As a result, Japan's financial
transactions centred on the banks. The development of the money and
capital markets were hindered. Finally, the free movemernt of funds to
and from overseas markets was not allowed.
The financial -climate began to change after the oil crises. The
greatest factor for the change comes from the economic structure.
Japan's economic growth rate has moderated to within 3% to 5% a year,
not the 10% of past years. A lower growth rate calls for a more
efficient financial system. Financial institutions must innovate, and
companies and households are becoming more interest-rate sensitive.
This stimulates the development of an open market, adding to the
pressure for deregulation.
Financial institutions in Japan are striving for internationali-
zation. First, capital raised in Japan by non-residents has grown.
Second, financing by Japanese companies in overseas markets has also
been on the increase since 1979. Finally, portfolio investment in
Japan by overseas investors and Japanese portfolio investment overseas
have grown rapidly since 1980. The internationalization of the
financial markets natually requires deregulation.
Although financial reform in Japan is in progress, the pace is not
very rapid. The main reason is that households have stuck to deposits
with low interest rates and have been reluctant to switch to open
market assets in their portfolio selection. Once the public (which
saves more than 18% of its disposable income) becomes more yield-
conscious, the movement towards liberalization will become widespread
and irreversible.
Since 1977, interest rates have not been regulated in the secondary
markets. So the regulated interest rates in the primary markets are
always exposed to strong market pressure, forcing the authorities to
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alter regulated interest rates rather frequently in accordance with
the development of marke t-determined interest rates in the secondary
markets. As interest rates are becoming more deregulated, smooth
international capital transactions through financial markets in Japan
are facilitated. Liberalization will make it easier for foreign
countries to have access to the extra savings of Japan.
5.2 The Internationalization of the Yen
The Yen has rapidly come to play a relatively important role in
financial transactions during the past three to four years. But its use
is still very limited. Japanese exports denominated in Yen accounted
for only 5% of the country's total exports in the early 1970s but nearly
40% now, reflecting the increasing proportion of high quality and
knowledge-intensive goods in total exports. In contrast, Japanese
imports denominated in Yen only account for 3% of total imports.
This is basically because three quarters of total Japanese imports
consist of raw materials and fuels which are invoiced mostly in US
dollars in the world's primary commodity markets. In other advanced
countries, 60% to 80% of exports and 30% to 50% of imports are
denominated in the national currency.
There is much potential for increasing the role of the Yen in
international transactions. First, the oil crises awoke the Japanese
to the fact that a large economy needs an internationalized currency:
Japan's largest import is dollar-denominated oil. Instead of keeping
the Japanese currency as weak as possible, the Ministry of Finance and
the Bank of Japan are aiming for a trade-off rate that keeps the Yen
strong enough to moderate imported inflation, but weak enough to keep
exports competitive. Export financing in Yen is encouraged.
Second, the Ministry of Finance is now working on a longer-term
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solution to increase the proportion of Yen-denominated import
financing. There is a possibility of pricing OPEC oil exports in Yen.
The Japanese believe that one-third of those imports could be priced
in Yen without unsettling domestic financial markets. The next surge
in the value of the Yen against the dollar would be favorable to this
development.
Third, the development of banker's acceptance markets in Tokyo
can enhance the international role of the Yen. Although Japanese firms,
particularly large ones, already have easy access to Yen finance for
their international trade, the establishment of bankers' acceptance
markets would raise the proportion of Japan's exports and imports of
manufactured goods denominated in Yen. The change is most likely if
international interest-rate considerations allow benefits to be given
to enterprises which shift to Yen finance from the currently-dominant
dollar finance.
On the one hand, there is much potential for the evolution of a Yen
currency block centered in the Asia Pacific region. More than 30% of
all two-way trade in Asia is now conducted with Japan. Japan is the
origin of more than half of the region's direct foreign investment.
The actual commercial demand for the Japanese currency is. a
prerequisite for the development of currency swaps involving the Yen.
On the other hand, the Japanese authorities only want a gradual
program to take place. The US Treasury Secretary, Mr. Donald Regan,
is pushing the liberalization very hard. But the Japanese have not
yet agreed to moves that could lead to a flourishing worldwide market
in bonds denominated in Yen. However, some changes in this area have
been enacted.
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5.3 The Liberalization of Bonds
Denominated in Yen
The liberalization of bonds denominated in Yen is important for two
reasons. First, less restrictions on the issue of Yen-denominated
instruments would accelerate the internationalization of the Yen.
Second, as bonds denominated in Yen become more popular, there are more
opportunities for arranging dollar/yen currency swaps.
In the past 10 years to the end of fiscal 1980, the outstanding
volume of yen bonds rose from 28% to 63% of GNP. The Japanese bond
markets has developed into a major source of funds for public and
private borrowers. To speed the internationalization of the yen, the
Ministry of Finance authorized the establishment of several markets
where foreign borrowers could raise funds through yen-denominated
securities. Rules governing the issuing of unsecured bonds in the
domestic market are being relaxed. The relaxed rules are now extended
to issues in the Euroyen market. Deregulation will allow the bond
markets to mature and eventually reach a level of sophistication
normally found in a country with an economy the size of Japan's.
The Japanese bond market is comprised of two main sectors: the
primary issue market and the foreign yen bonds market. In terms of
volume, the primary issue market is much larger than the foreign yen
bonds market and grew at a very rapid pace during the 1970s. In fiscal
1980, new primary issues of all types amounted to Y36.77 trillion, or
5.9 times the level floated 10 years earlier. Outstanding issues grew
7.3 times to Y154.09 trillion. In contrast, foreign yen bond issues of
all types amounted to Y2.351 trillion by the end of fiscal 1980.
Slower economic growth since the 1973 oil crisis has brought a
large budget deficit. In fiscal 1974, the central government was
authorized to issue bonds to make up for the deficit. In fiscal 1980,
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the public sector accounted for 75.2% of all outstanding bond issues in
Japan. The glut of government paper has crowded out domestic corporate
issuers, forcing them to turn to Europe to issue bonds.
5.3.1 The Primary Issue Market
The composition of primary bond issues in Japan by type of bond in
1980 reflects the fact that private corporate issues have been crowded
out of the bond market (see Table 5.1). Their share of new issues
fell from 11.8% in fiscal 1970 to only 3.0% in fiscal 1980.
Table 5.1 Primary Bond Issues in Japan by Type of Bond in Fiscal 1980










Private sector total 40.7
Total 100.0
Note: Out of a total amount of Y36.77 trillion
Source: Industrial Bank of Japan
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Of the different types, government guaranteed bonds and corporate
bonds are the primary targets for currency swaps. Among the many public
corporations which exist in Japan in which the government holds equity,
31 are legally allowed to issue government guaranteed bonds. By fiscal
1980, 21 bodies had done so, and 19 still had issues outstanding. The
amount of bonds to be issued by each body is determined every year by
the Ministry of Finance. Recently, the Ministry has began increasing
the number of quasi-governmental entities that are allowed to issue
their own bonds directly.
Japan Air Lines (JAL), theoretically a private company listed on
the Tokyo Stock Exchange, is in practice a government entity, with
38% of its shares held by the Ministry of Finance. JAL is one of the
corporations allowed to issue government guaranteed bonds. In fiscal
1983, it had 10 domestic bond issues outstanding. Because JAL has to
pay for new aircraft and aviation fuel in US dollars out of a mixed
bag of currencies earned, it is the biggest Japanese taker of currency
swaps. In its latest swap deal, JAL is believed to have arranged the
largest ever long-term currency swap. JAL's US $75 million was swapped
with a package of outstanding debt issues.
The second target that has potential for currency swaps is
corporate bonds. There are three principal categories. First, the
highest-grade securities are issued by Japan's nine electric power
companies. Second, the highest-rated Japanese manufacturing, wholesal-
ing, and retailing corporations issue straight bonds. Finally, since
1966 these same corporations have been allowed to offer convertible
bonds.
After the economic crisis of the 1930s, any new bond issues has to
be backed by collateral in order to protect investors. By the late
1970s,' the Ministry of Finance agreed that the security requirement
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should be lifted. In a compromise, uniform eligibility standards are
imposed. At first, the rules concerning debt/equity ratio, operating
profit, interest coverage, etc. are very strict. Recently, the rules
have been relaxed, and more corporations are eligible for issuing
unsecured bonds. Direct long-term financing is made easier for private
corporations.
5.3.2 The Foreign Yen Bonds Market
An important luilestone in the internationalization of the yen was
the establishment of several markets where foreign borrowers could
issue yen-denominated securities. By far the most popular are yen-
denominated public bonds floated in Japan by foreign borrowers, known
as Samurai bonds. Growing in importance are Euroyen bonds which are
yen-denominated public bonds floated outside Japan-- mainly in the
European markets. The liberalization in these two markets provides
more opportunities for corporations to tap yen funds. Private
placements by foreign borrowers with Japanese institutional investors
are also popular. Liberalization during these two to three years has
been centred on Samurai and Euroyen bonds. The total amount of foreign
yen bonds has grown by 76.6% to Y987.0 billion during 19 77-82 (Table
5.2). Future growth is expected to be even faster. As more and more
corporations can tap yen funds, the potential for taking currency swaps
will also increase.
68
Table 5. 2 The Growth of Foreign Yen Bonds Market
(Amounts in billion yen)
TnralPrivateEuroyenFY Samurai
75.045419 77 30 559.0
1978 15 82.0 754.0657
1979 28 4 25 45.2 354.2
75 17.51980 280 372.5
150.0613 801981 843.0
110 187.06 901982 987.0(a)
Notes: Fiscal year is April-March
(a) Estimates up to March 1983
Source: More Freedom for Samurai Issuers, Asian Finance, 15 August,
1983, p.48.
Until 1983, a queue system for new issues of Samurai bonds was
maintained. The queue could range anywhere from three to 15 months,
depending on market conditions. In January 1983, the queue system was
compressed into a 3-month t imef rame so that borrowers could come to the
market much sooner. Effective July 1983, the time for negotiation
between issuers and underwriters was also reduced. Now, the same
borrower will have the freedom to tap the market as and when it likes,
regardless of the interval of two quarters previously enforced between
successive issues. Moreover, even first-timers will now be allowed to
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make Double-A rated issues instead of the previously obligatory Triple-
A rating. All these relaxations mean that there will be a surge in the
issue of Samurai bonds.
The second area where there is significant liberalization is
Euroyen bonds. In the past only a limited number of foreign governments
and international institutions were allowed to make Euroyen issues.
Highly restricted guidelines have limited issues to around six a year
and to amounts of Y15 billion, except for the World Bank, which can
raise up to Y20 billion. Effective April 1984, Japanese companies will
for the first time be allowed to issue Euroyen bonds. Under the new
guidelines, 30 Japanese companies will be able to issue straight Euroyen
bonds, and 90 more will to allowed to issue convertibles. The relaxed
rules will allow each company or institution to make one issue a month
up to a maximum of Y20 billion. The new rules also end the exclusive
right of Japanese security houses to lead manage the issues. These
liberalizing measures will facilitate corporations and institutions,
both Japanese and foreign, to tap the large pool of European yen funds,
which is estimated to be about Y7 trillion, held largely by Japanese
banks abroad.
Apart from the bonds discussed, debentures issued by banks, term-
loans granted by the long-term credit banks, Samurai loans, etc. may be
potential candidates as the yen-leg of dollar/yen swaps. In this
respect, fixed rate, low interests, genuine need are essential
features. Nevertheless, the growth of swaps depends on whether the
Ministry of Finance will liberalize the main character-- currency
swaps.
5.4 The Swap Regulator
Currency swaps in Japan are supervised by the Ministry of Finance.
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The Ministry acts as the Japanese equivalent of the US Treasury,
Internal Revenue Service, Securities and Exchange Commission, and the
state banking commissions, and has many of the policy-making
responsibilities of the Federal Reserve Board. It also regulates to a
certain extent the activities of all financial institutions operating in
Japan. The power of the Ministry has no parallel in the United States
and the EEC. Hence, understanding the control measures and organization
of the Ministry is a key prerequisite for the success of a foreign bank
in Japan. This is no exception for currency swaps in Japan.
Currency swaps may create a capital markets problem that
regulators do not want to see. The more developed the swap market, the
quicker the anomalies between markets will be spotted and exploited.
From the point of view of a country's economic policy, there is a danger
that domestic interest rates will be hit. In Switzerland, the Swiss
National Bank is changing its attitude to dual-currency bond issues
because the francs are purely used for their low interest-rate. If
anyone's being exploited here it's the Swiss investors, accepting too
low a coupon from a quality US name, said one investment banker.
So for the same reasons, the Japanese Ministry of Finance dislikes
yen currency swaps. The rule in Japan is to use existing debt only.
New bond issues with a view to arrange currency swaps are not allowed.
One result of this pressure to use existing debt is that more swaps
are done unpublicized. It is then difficult for the participants to
gauge the size of the market, the volume of swaps being done, and the
scale of fees and rewards. It also means that a default, even a. major
iThe Way into Any Market, Euromoney, November, 1983, p. 75.
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one, may never be made public.
Currency swaps was a financing option reserved by the Ministry of
Finance to government-ralated entities. In November 1983, the Ministry
began to make access to swaps more liberal, and widened the permitted
combinations of currencies. As a consequence, the market in swaps will
probably expand rapidly. Yet, its future will be contingent upon the
changes in attitude on the part of the regulators.
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CHAPTER VI
EXPLORATORY STUDY ON THE COMMERCIAL
NEEDS FOR CURRENCY SWAPS IN
THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION
Two industries with suspected high potential to use currency swaps
in this region are analysed in detail. They are the offshore oil
ventures in China and the shipping industry. This approach of analysing
opportunities and needs in teens of specific industries has been widely
accepted by major commercial banks. It is believed that the same is
also true in applying currency swaps to corporate customers.
Other potential takers of currency swaps can be analysed in the
same manner to spot marketing opportunities and problems in the Asia
Pacific region. Industry groupings appealing for further exploration
include utilities, coal, airline, real estate and banking.
6.1 Opportunities in China's Offshore Oil Ventures
The petroleum import bill in the Asia Pacific region reached a
staggering US$72 billion in 1982 (including imports from within the
region), with Japan taking up some 70% of the total. Involvement by
foreign oil companies has increased dramatically during the past few
years. Historically, three areas in Asia have been focal points for
exploration and development over the past 20 years: Indonesia, East
Malaysia and Brunei. Recently, however, the amount of oil that lies
hidden in the sedimentary folds of China's vast continental shelf has
attracted a lot of attention. It may well be the richest area in the
world waiting to be explored.
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6.1.1 Current Development and Future Prospects
Advances in China's modernisation programme will naturally be
accompanied by a great demand for energy. Offshore oil exploitation is
especially important to the country now that onshore production has
been falling. Basically, China is looking for offshore oil to support
the petrochemical and related processing industries and to earn foreign
exchange through exports. China's stated goal is to double its crude
oil. production to an average of four million b/d (barrels per day) by
the year 2000. Meeting that goal will require increased exploration and
development, backed by huge capital investment and technical know-how.
China's attraction lies in its largely unexplored continental shelf
which stretches some 18,000 kms, covers an area of about 620,000
sq.kms, including the Bohai Sea Basin, Huanghai Sea Basin, East
China Sea Basin, Zhujiang River estuary Basin, Beiba Gulf Basin and
Yingge Sea Basin. They could well hold some 30-50 billion tonnes of
oil in reserve, according to more modest non-Chinese estimates.
China lacks both the technology and funds necessary for developing
the offshore resources. Therefore foreign oil companies have been
invited to help the offshore programme get off the ground. China is
also drawing the attention of aviation firms and suppliers of ships and
other support services.
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), set up under the
Ministry of Petroleum Industry (NoPI) to monitor exploration and
development of offshore resources, is empowered to sign contracts with
foreign companies. During 1980-82, some 50,000 sq.kms offshore area
were awarded without bidding to foreign companies for exploration.
In the first round of bidding up to the end of 1983 no fewer than 27 oil
companies from nine different countries had signed co-operative agree-
ments with China, with 26 companies to work. on oil-extraction in the
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South China Sea.
In 1982, some 20 wells (16 exploratory and 4 development) were
drilled offshore. The success ratio varies from field to field but is
encouraging overall. Of 25 exploratory wells drilled up to early 1982,
9 are considerable commercial discoveries, all with moderate depths
of 2,000-4,000 meters.
However, contracts signed in the first round of bidding, which
commit foreign partners to drill over 120 exploratory wells within. thre(
years, emerge with quite disappointing results. Foreign companies find
that several Chinese demands, such as costs for Chinese support service,
labour and on-the-job training costs and hazy legal requirements create
many problems. Overall, China is much tougher in its demands than other
underdeveloped oil producing countries concerning operational control,
technology transfer and cost sharing. The offshore fields are regarded
by many foreign companies as high-cost operations under present terms.
Naturally, the commercial exploitation of marginal fields (where the
returns on investment are low) would be ruled out. But marginal fields
are very common from exploration so far.
Although in exploration terms the poor results do not rule out
substantial fields in what is still considered one of the word's last
offshore frontiers, they will weaken China's hand in the second round
of bidding, to be announced in 1985. Presumably, a new contract model
will he released and a new way of dividing up oil shares will be
devised. It is also expected. that some legal articles would be adjusted
and improved by drawing, on experience from the first round. Foreign
companies are unlikely to leave the oil fields at this stage.
6.1.2 Financing Potential and Obstacles
Financing offshore oil ventures in China should not be a very
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different process from that in other oil producing countries around the
world. Oil ventures can be divided into four categories: services and
supply, rigs and boats, government oil and development finance. The
latest estimate, by London brokers De Zoete and Bevan, is that the
offshore programme will consume US$75 billion over the next decade
equipment alone will make up US$50 billion of the bill. Earlier
estimates were much lower, in the range US$20-35 billion.
Financing services and supply is just like other activities. For
rigs and boats, certain special ship financing techniques are involved.
Chinese government oil financing poses some unanswered questions. By
choice, China will provide half of the funds needed to develop the
offshore areas. It is still unknown where China will obtain such a
large amount of money. Development finance involves financing the
expenditures required to bring a field to production..
Next to equity, bank money is the most common form of oil develop--
meat finance. Foreign comnircial banks will be central to the fundrrais--
ing of fo rt. Hong Kong's established merchant banking capabilities
assure that most syndicated loans will be arranged here. World Bank
participation is a strong possibility. The Japanese are pushing hard
to get involved. Proximity will rake it advantageous for Japan to
provide and finance major components of China's offshore development
needs.
Presently, China has access to low-rate, long-term financing from
organisations such as the World Banff, and the International Monetary
Fund, besides substantial preferential credit lines with a number of
Western governments and Japan. So the prospects for China being a
major borrower from, foreign commercial sources in the next year or so
are probably limited. But, over the next five or six years, it is
estimated that China will need over USS10 billion to finance its portion
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of the oil development programme, after discoveries are declared
commercial.
China, with over US$13 billion in foreign exchange reserves, plus
substantial reserves of gold and silver, has no lack of funds. But it
may not want to depend on national funds for financing if its oil
reserves can provide collateral for borrowing. The Bank of China and
CNOOC have made it clear that they expect to raise most of the required
funds from foreign financial sources.
There are a variety of forms China financing could take. One
strong possibility is for CNOOC to project finance its share of the
development similar to the oil companies' method. There can he
syndicated floating rates Eurocurrency borrowing. Export credit
financing from European., North American, and Japanese sources at fixed
rates could also provide funds. Leasing of equipment is very likely.
And it is possible that China would like to broaden its activities in
the international financial markets by issuing Euronotes or bonds.
Some groundwork has been done in this direction. The Pant of China
has become very interested in the concept of project financing, and has
set up a special energy division in its head office in Beijing. Chinese
officals have indicated that they find the concept of leasing very
attractive and four leasing companies-- two in collaboration with
foreigners and two domestic entities in eastern China-- have been
established. Last year, China launched two successful bond issues in
Japan. It seems only logical that financial vehicles such as these
should be explored further.
In addition. foreign oil companies will need to raise another US$
10 billion, mostly for the importation of foreign equipment, in the next
f ive or six years. In the meantime, there will be some opportunities
for project financing of smaller magnitudes in hotels, housing
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complexes, supplies and equipment joint venture projects, etc. related
to oil development.
That is not to say that there would not be obstacles. Tradition-
ally, for ideological reasons, China has been reluctant to borrow. That
attitude is changing, but it takes time. There has to be an educational
process before new concepts like project financing and leasing get
widespread acceptance. Despite mentioning bonds, it is doubtful whether
China would want to submit to the required issuance procedures, or
whether it would tolerate the rate of return in the foreign bond market.
During his recent visit to Beijing, a chemical banker got the impression
that some Chinese officals are looking for two per cent interest loans
1
to finance their offshore oil ventures.
6.1.3 Application of Currency Swaps
It is expected that nearly all of the capital expenditures, and oii
revenues will be denominated in foreign currencies since the Rmb lacks
convertibility. The bulk of the transactions will be in US dollars.
The Japanese yen will be fairly common, taking into consideration the
large Japanese influence in China's oil development and the gradual
internationalization of the yen. This would he more so if the Japanese
succeed in denominating some of its import oil bill in yen (see
section 5-2).
'Theoretically, there are many applications of currency swans
1 South China Morning Post, 21 March, 1984.
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into fixed-rate yen debt. It may be used for taking advantage of
to China's offshore oil ventures. For example, bonds may be issued in
Japan and swapped into US dollars to achieve a cheaper all-in cost of
capital. Eurodollar syndicated floating rate borrowing can be swapped
subsidized export credit financing from European, North American, and
Japanese goverru-ients while eliminating currency exposure. Currency
swaps can also be used to write equipment lease contracts on a hedged
basis.
There are many difficulties to be overcome. It may be very
difficult to sell the concept of currency swaps to Chinese officials.
A prominent Morgan banker here has the experience of trying to educate
some Chinese officals the mechanism of currency swaps. It appears that
it is very hard for them to unders tand the benefits of a swap
transaction, not to say the cash flows involved and the element of
long-date forward cover. It is expected that more effort will be spent
on making proposals to Chinese organisations, giving advice in
negotiations and finding an appropriate counter-party.
Another major limitation concerns the high risk associated with
oil ventures. This will make it more difficult for the intermediary
bank to act in the middle as a guarantor. Project financing, which will
he very important in financing the production phase, is discussed to
expose the problems involved.
In project financing, a separate legal entity is usually formed
which owns the project. In this ins tance, a joint venture between a
foreign oil company and CNOOC may be created. Suppliers of capital then
look to the earnings stream of the project for repayment of their loan
or for the return on their equity investment. Part of the capital comes
from equity participation by the investors, and the rest comes from
lenders and/or lessors. In oil project financing, the primary concern
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of banks is whether there are sufficient oil resources in the property
dedicated as collateral, and whether they can be produced at an
economic rate to ensure an adequate cash flow to operate the project and
cover debt service.
There are two basic risks involved. First, the project may not be
completed according to the pre-determined plan or schedule. This is
called programme risk and arises from the unavoidable lack of precision
in engineering assessments and development plans that must be made early
in a programme with limited data on the oil reservoir. Second, the
project may not generate sufficient cash flows to repay the debt. This
is called payout risk and depends on the operator's performance and
reliability, market price stability of oil and the political situation.
Of course, the lending banks would require that appropriate
completion guarantees be given by the foreign contractor and China,
especially at the initial stage of oil production. This provides
additional recourse for loan repayment if the primary reccxlrse to the
debt is not provided for by sale of the recovered oil due to failure
to complete the oil programme as agreed.
But for the intermediary bank involved in guaranteeing repayments,
there would be greater exchange exposure risk for this kind of oil
project financing. For example, if a Japanese counter-party can repay
its US dollar interest and principal obligations, the intermediary bank
must pay the corresponding yen interest and principal to discharge the
Japanese counter-party's debt. So, if the Chinese oil venture cannot
service the debt, the intermediary bank would withhold the US. dollar
cash flows. The lending bank would have recourse for loan repayments.
For the intermediary batik, there is an exchange exposure because it is
not prepared to take a long position in US dollar and short position in
yen. The intermediary bail may charge a higher fee for this kind of
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risk, but the cost will become so high that currency swaps may lose its
attractiveness.
6.2 Opportunities in the Shipping Industry
Hong Kong is one of the major shipping and ship financing centres
in the world. Many ship financing deals in the Asia Pacific region are
arranged in Hong Kong. The impetus behind these financing activities
comes from the Hong Kong shipowners, Hong Kong bankers and the
i
shikumisen mechanism.
Hong Kong shipowners are famous for their ship financing skills.
Sometimes, Hong Kong shipowners are described as ship financiers rather
than shipowners by people in the shipping industry. Therefore, there
should be much opportunity to provide a sophisticated financial product
such as currency swaps to the Hong Kong shipowners. The lowering of
borrowing costs can be a very attractive element to these sensitive
f inanciers.
Besides, the shipping industry always needs new ships to replace
old ones. Such replacement includes scrapping the old one, upgradi rip
and restructuring of the fleet. In addi Lion, the purchase of second
hand tonnage will always exist. All these activities will bring new
ship financing business to the bankers. Therefore, there will be many
-opportunities to arrange currency swaps in these ship financing deals.
I
This mechanism will be discussed in sect ion 622
Revell, Michael D. Good Omens For An Upturn, But Case For Industry
Overhaul Strong, Asian Finance, March 15, 1983, P.71.
81
This section will first analyse the current developments and future
prospects of the shipping industry. Then potential and obstacles in
ship financing, including the shikumisen mechanism, will be discussed.
Finally, the application of currency swaps in ship financing will be
investigated.
6.2.1 Current Developments and Future Prospects
The shipping industry is still facing the problem of surplus
tonnage. Ship operating costs are rising. Due to intense competition,
the freight rates in n uny trades are at an historically low level in
r. eat terms.l Moreover, it was said that the rates should rise 15 per
cent to 17 per cent before shipowners can consider building new vessels.
Furthermore, a recent OECD study predicts that world trade will not
boost the demand for shipping until late in 1984 at the earliest. 3 In
short, the shipping industry has over-expanded and it has to enter a
period of consolidation. Besides, there are some significant issues
worth noticing.
1. Japanese Lines' Improvement Programme
The Japanese lines invest. heavily to improve their fleets. An
4
outstanding example is Sanko Line. It ordered 111 ships from the
1
Slater, W.B. Lines' Earnings Lagging Behind, South China Morning
Post, April 25, 1984,
2 ibid.
3 Sohmen, Helmut. Shipping, Through The Eyes Of Hong Kong Shipowner,
Shippers Today, November/December 1983, P.16-17.
4 Shipping, Asia 1984 Yearbook, P.90-92.
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Japanese shipyards in 19 83. Nearly all the ships S art{o ordered are
handy-sized bulkers (20-40,000 dwt). However, the company also plans to
dispose of a large portion of its fleet.
As a result, the net effect of Sanko's improvemet programme is to
reduce its fleet to around 8 million dwt from the current 14 million
dwt. Such fleet reorganization is aimed at meeting the market demand,
saving the operating costs and keeping pace with competition.
Therefore, the prospect for new ship financing deals is not as gloomy as
the industry's current performance.
2. Financial Difficulty of Shipping Companies
In 1978, the Japan Line nearly went into bankrupty. Its financial
difficulty also nearly brought down Sir Y.K. Pao World's Wide group
which heavily relied on Japan Line's charter, In the 1983 financial
year, Mitsui OSK, Showa and Y.S. Lines all reported drops in profits.
The K-Line had gone into red together with Japan Line. The only
1
Japanese shipping company which reported a rise in prof its was 14YK Line.
Moreove r, the chairman of the General Council of British Shipping said
that it has been any years since revenues have covered operating costs.
He also mentioned that no free enterprise industry could continue to
z
provide services at a loss for long. Furthermore, Hong Kong's
.3
second-largest liner company, Hong Kong Islands Line, only narrowly
I
In Brief, Asian Shipping, January 1984.
z
Slater, W.B. Lines' Earnings Lagging Behind, South China t-fornin
Post, April 25, 1984.
-3 Nightmares About Huge New Shikunisen Deals, Far Eastern Economic
Review, February 16, 1984, P.40-41.
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avoided bankruptcy by selling a 60% stake in its company to the property
developer New World Development.
3. Developing Countries' National Flag
Many developing countries plan to become directly involved in their
maritime transport and to build up their own national fleets. The
People's Republic of China is a good example. It plans to build a new
fleet which will increase to 20 million dwt by 1990 and will eventually
rise to 30 million dwt by the end of the century.1
As a result, these developing countries work against the flag-
of-convenience shipping companies (eg. Hong Kong shipowners' Liberia, or
Panama, registered ships)and demand for a "genuine link". That is,
there should be a real link between the ship's registration and the
nationality of the ownership. Besides, many developing countries
suggest the practise of the 40-40-20 Liner Code concept which calls for
the splitting of cargo share 40% for the importing country, 40% for the
exporting country and 20% for third parties. If these two concepts are
put into practice, they will seriously hurt the Hong Kong shipping
community.2 Therefore, the Hong Kong shipowners try to form joint
ventures in the region -- with countries like indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines and Thailand which need shipping services.
6.2.2 Financing Potential and Obstacles
The most famous ship financing technique used by the Hong Kong
1 Lauriat, George."Tremendous Peking Newbuildings To Double The Fleet
By 1990", Far Eastern Ecomomic Review, February 16, 1984, P.35-36.
2 Lauriat, George. "No More Buccaneering After 1997, My Hearties",
Far Eastern Economic Review, February 16, 1984, P.42-49.
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shipowners is the shikumisen mec'hanisin. In addition, leveraged
leasing is now gaining in popularity.
1. Shikumisen Mechanism
Basically, the shikumisen mechanism involves a charter, that is,
a lease. its advantage mainly comes from tax savings, lowering of
operating costs and obtaining low interest export credit. To illustrate
the basic skikumisen mechanism, the Japanese trading house and the




Debt Export credit in yen
repayment to finance the building
of the shipin yen
}long Kong Japanese
shipowner with charter hire in shipping
ship registered U. S. dollar. company
under Hag-of-
convenience charter agreement
Figure 6. 1 basic Framework of the Shikumi sen Mechanism
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In Figure 6.1, the Hong Kong shipowner can obtain the low interest
and fixed-interest yen export credit to finance the building of the
ship. If the Japanese shipping company directly orders the ship from
Japanese shipyard, it cannot obtain the export credit from the Exim
Bank. Besides, the ship is registered under a flag-of--convenience
(FOC). This provides tax savings for the Hong Kong shipowner since the
FOC countries are tax havens. Under FOC, the operating costs for the
Japanese company is lowered, since cheaper crew can be employed.
However, the Japanese shipping companies started setting up their
own subsidiaries in offshore centres such as Singapore and Hong Kong to
substitute for the role of the Hong Kong shipowners in the traditional
shikumisen. The new arrangement was called false shikumisen. That
means, the Hong Kong shipowners' opportunities are being taken away.
Nevertheless, the Hong Kong shipowner 'was allowed to participate on a
1
50:50 basis in many cases.
2. Leveraged Leasirig
This is a kind of leasing with part equity/part debt financing. As
a result, it provides a further tax offset in the form of deductible
interest payments and further lowers the lease payments. It is gaining
more popularity in the region as corporations become increasingly
sophisticated in their tax planning.
6.2.3 Application of Currency Swaps
Currency swaps can be built into ship financing in two ways. The
I
Lobo, G.A. Hong Kong Shippii: The Inside Stow, Lloyd's of London
Press, Ltd., 1981,P.105.
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first one utilizes the shikuri sen mechanism and the second one makes
use of the yen-denominated lease.
1. Utilizin the Shikumisen Mechanism
The low interest and fixed-interest export credit from the EXIM
Bank provides a very good source for capital markets arbitrage.
In Figure 6.1, the Hong Kong shipowner receives the charter hire in
US dollar but repays the debt in yen. This creates a foreign exchange
exposure for the shipowner. Especially in these few years, the
fluctuation of yen/US$ exchange rate has made foreign exchange exposure
in yen highly undesirable. Therefore, the Hong Kong shipowner should be
highly motivated to hedge against this exposure. Obviously, this
creates an opportunity for the Bank to arrange yen-U.S. dollar currency
swaps for the shipowner to hedge against the yen exposure.
On the other hand, there should be a considerable number of
organizations wanting to be the counter-parties for such yen-U.S. dollar
currency swap. These organizations include U.S. companies which have or
will have direct investments or portfolio investments in Japan, large
Japanese companies which can raise fairly low cost U.S. dollar funds,
Japanese companies which have U.S. dollar-denominated debt, and
companies which want to get low-interest and fixed-interest funds.
These kinds of organizations are increasing in number. The reasons
behind this increase include increased foreign investment in the
Japanese market, internation- alization of Japanese banks, increased
activity in exchange exposure management in Japanese corporations, and
the low interest rate in the yen capital market.
In short, the potential for arranging currency swaps for Hong Kong
shipowners through the shikumisen mechanism should be fairly great.
Besides, when the Hong Kong shipowner is replaced by a subsidiary of a
Japanese shipping company, the currency swap can still be arranged for
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the Japanese subsidiary through the false shikurisen,
If the trans-actio-ns are illustrated in. a diagram, they will be as
follows:
Future interest payments and principal r jments
Hong Ko rig Bang.Us$ Counter-tUs$





Figure 6.2 Currency Swaps Utilizing The Shikumisen Mechanism
2. Utilizing Leveraged Leasing and the Lessee is U.S.-based
When the lease is yen--denominated and the lessee is U.S.-based,
there will be an opportunity to arrange a currency swap for the lessee.
Though there is considerable variation in leasing agreements, the basic
framework of such currency swaps can be discussed.
One basic factor for such currency swaps is that the lessee should
want to hedge against the yen-denominated lease payments. Therefo re,
the currency swap offer an efficient tool for them to hedge against this
foreign exchange exposure. The potential counter-parties are sir ilar to
those in the section, utilizing shikumiseri mechanism. The basic
transactions are shown as follows:
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Future payments
Us Us s Bank Counter-U S 8









Currency swaps provide a great challenge to the banking mind.
There are unlimited possibilities and combinations of markets, clients
and risks.
The first step for a bank to enter the swap business is to analyse
its access to capital markets, client base, risk management ability and
marketing strength. Knowledge of the bank's organization and what it
can do is as important as innovative ideas. A competent task force with
strong technical expertise and marketing skills has to be built.
7.2 Pr ici ig of Currency Swaps
As described in section 4.1.4 (summary of section 4.1 pricing of
the long-dated forward contract), the fully arbitraged cash-flow--
based pricing method is the best pricing method since foreign exchange
exposure is fully hedged. Though the exchange of borrowings method is
alos fully-hedged, the method is only applicable in limited cases.
Nevertheless, there are still a number of technical problems to be
solved in using the fully arbitraged cash-flow-based method. One of
these is the mismatch of maturity days in the hedge. The using of
-financial futures to close the mismatch is proposed. But, the exact
calculation of the cost involved in these transaction is left to the
practitioners in the financial futures market to formulate.
Besides the above proposal, the Treasury of Citibank Hong Kong can
also try to participate in the international bond markets. If the
organizational issues in the Bank are disregarded, the trading of
international bonds will complement the Treasury's operation in money
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markets and toreign exchange markets. Particularly, many international
securities are fixed-rate. They are ideal components to structure the
hedge in the fully arbitraged cash-flow-based method.
Finally, active monitoring of arbitrage opportunities among capital
markets also allows the Treasury to offer attractive forward prices of
the currencies. Such attractive prices, in many cases, constitute the
core element in currency swaps which are created to save finding costs
for corporations. If the Treasury is sensitive enough to catch these
long-term arbitrage opportunities quickly, it may be able t9o arrange
fully hedged dual-currency swaps which are still the pride of Morgan
Grenfell up till now.
Turning to the determination of fees charged, the importance of the
negotiation factor is discussed. Therefore, the marketing officers for
currency swaps should be equipped with negotiating skills and well-
informed about the customers' positions.
7.3 The US Dollar/Yen Market
The US dollar/yen market has great potential for currency swaps in
the Asia Pacific region. The regulators in Japan, however, dictates to
a large extent what can be done in this market.
The current liberalization of the Japanese financial system should
be tracked closely. The changing attitude of the Ministry of Finance
-towards currency swaps is of particular importance.
7.4 Commercial Needs
It is helpful to understand the need, potential and application for
currency swaps in terms of industry groupings. Oil, shipping, airline,
utilities, coal and even banking are suitable candidates for further
study. Some exploratory study has been devoted to the oil and shipping
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industries in this report.
7.4.1 China's Offshore Oil Ventures
The potential for commercial banks to lend to foreign oil companies
and perhaps the Chinese Government is great. The import of capital
equipment and the export of oil will involve transactions is. foreign
currencies of substantial size. However, it will take some time for the
Chinese officals to understand the world financial markets, and to
employ oil financing techniques like project financing, leasing and swap
mechanisms
Patience, education and negotiation are essential for developing a
swap business with the Chinese. As an intermediary bank, the exchange
exposure involved in guaranteeing default risk should be thoroughly
understood.
7.4. 2 Shipping Industry
Citibank Hong Kong has a separate division working on ship
financing. The Bank has great opportunity to arrange currency swaps for
the industry since it has a large client base.
Currency swaps utilizing the shikumisen mechanism and yen-
denominated lease in ship financing and discussed in section 6a2.3„
Marketing of the sophisticated financial product can start with those
-large shipowners who are financially more sensitive. Moreover,
shipowners with large yen-exposure are also good targets.
Finally, Japanese shipping companies should be a large market with
high potential. They are financially sensitive since most of them have
experienced declines in profits. They are investing heavily in fleet
improvement programmes. Moreover, Japanese shipping companies are
(or Singapore) to structure false-setting up subsidiaries in Hong Kong
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shikumisen deals described in section 6.2.2. Adding these to the
growing sophistication in exposure management in Japanese commercial
circles, the Japanese shipping companies should be a very rewarding




Bronte, Stephen. Japanese Finance: Markets and Institutions,
Eurorroney Publications, 1982.
Feigh, G., Jacquillat, B. International Finance. Text and Gases,
Allyn and Bacon, Inc... 1982.
Lobo, G.A. Hong Kong Shipping: The inside Stogy, L. Lloyd's of
London Press, Ltd... 1981.
MaRae, T.W., and Walker, P.P. Foreign Exchange '.`lanageme nL, p.60,
Prentice/Hall International, Inc., 1980.
Pe riodicals
Antl, Boris. Pricing the Hedge to Cut the Cost. Euromon, May
1983, pp.230-233.
Be id leman, Carl R., Hil ley, John L., and Greenleaf, ,James A. Alt-
ernatives`.in Hedging Long-Date Contractural Foreign Exchange
Exposure. Sloan Management Review, Summer 1983. D D.45-53.
Connors, Michael. Heavy Investment in Fleet Improvements by Main
Japanese Lines. Asian Shi.pEg, January 1984, p• 16
Curtin, Donal. Deals that Made the Record Books. Euromoney,
September 1983, pp,106-116.
Davis, Michael G.J. No Scarcity of Ship Finance, But Lending
Criteria Stricter. Asian Finance, March 15, 1983, pp. 80-32
Emmons, Thomas. Where Will the Money Come From? Petroleum News,
April 1983, pp.32-33.
Jury, Alan. Special Report:: leasing, Australia 1984 Will be a
Boom Year. Asian Finance, February 15, 1984, pp.86-87.
Kemp, Donald S. Hedging a Long-Term Financing. Euromoney,
February 1981, pp..102-105.
Lauriat, George. Tremendous Peking Newbuildings To Double The
Fleet by 1990. Far Eastern. Economic Review, February 16,
1984, pp. 3 5-3 6.
Lauriat, George. No More Baccaneering After 1997, My Hearties.
Far Eastern Economic Review, February 16, 1984, pp.42-49.
94
Ma, Teresa, "Foreigners too Would Like Some Offshoot Business."
Far Eastern Economic Review, August 25, 1983, pp.61-63.
MacBride Price, John A., Keller, J., Neilson, M. "The Delicate
Art of Swaps." Eu.romonei, April 1983, pp. 118-l25.
Mugar, Jayson. "Rigging out China's Offshore Oil Development."
Asian Banki n, April 19 83, pp. 5 8-64.
OK umura, Hirohiko. "Financial Liberalization Cathers Pace."
The Banker, January 1984, pp. 6 9-76.
Revell, Michael D. "Good Omens for an Upturn, But Case for Industry
Overhaul Strong." Asian Finance, March 15, 1983, pp. 69-71
Sohmeri, Helmut. "Shipping Through the Eyes of a Hong Kong
Shipowner." Shippers Today, November/December 1983, pp. 16-17.
Tait, Simon. "It takes Two to Tango." Euromoney9 February 1983,
pp. 75-81.
Yoshitorni, Masaru. "Adjusting the Yen to Japan's Role of
International Creditor." The Banker, January 1984, pp. 85-91
"Shipping." Asia 1984 Yearbook, South China Morning post Limited
1984, pp.90-92.
"China Lifts the Lid Over Hugh Financing Potential." Asian Finance,
15 December, 1983, pp.72-74.
"More Freedom for Samurai Issuers." Asian Finance, 15 August, 1983,
pp.48-50.
"In Brief." Asian Shippir, January 1984, pp.62-63.
"Oil Exploitation in South China Sea (I): The Eve of a Massive
Battle." Beijing Review, April 9, 1984, pp.19-22.
"The Way into Any Market. Euromoney." November 1983, pp6O-75,
"Nightmares About Huge New Shikumisen Deals." Far Eastern Economic
Review, February 16, 1984, pp.40-41.
95
News papers
Hong Kong Economic Journal (Chinese)
The South China Morning Post
interviews
Alex Li, Citibank N.A December 23, 1983
Alex Li, and Stephen Yau, Citibank N.A. January 6, 1984


